f, A COSTLY TREATY
1 Home from Europe, Setretary of State
Dulles expressed himself as on the whole,
encouraged." He thought the formation of a
European defense community of six nations
was far from hopeless, tho he was not in-
I clined to "minimize the difficulties." He said
that the United States had been supporting j
the North Atlantic Treaty organization in the
faith that these nations would themselves
provide the basic foundation of their own se
curity thru an integrated defense force that
could not be used for national aggrandize
ment.
Mr. Dulles' description suggests that the
E. D. C. is not an expression of mutual trust
among the European countries, but of dis
trust. If national military contributions can
)bè made to a supranational army, there is less
chance that one of the western European na
tions will use its army to turn upon another.
Despite Mr. Dulles' professed optimism, it
was predicted by the leader of Gen. De Gaulle's
party in the French assembly that the E. D. C.
treaty will never be ratified. This prophecy
came from Gaston Palewski, vice president of
the assembly. He said that if Dulles had his
way, a rearmed Germany would overthrow
present territorial dispositions.
If the French refuse to go thru with
E. D. C., Mr. Dulles will be confronted with
the necessity of determining what American
policy is then to be. He concedes that Ameri
can support of the Atlantic pact has hitherto
been predicated on faith that France will join
with West Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium,
and Luxemburg in a European army. If this
combined force does not materialize, then
What?
In such circumstances, Mr. Dulles, unless he
chooses to knuckle under, will have to admit
that the keystone of NATO is missing and the
Atlantic policy is a failure. There will then
be little point in continuing very large Ameri
can gifts of arms and money to nations which
refuse to subscribe to a structure which the
secretary regards as indispensable.
If this situation arises and the Eisenhower
administration does nothing about it, the for
eign policy as applied to Europe will be a
futility. The remaining options are to seek a
more limited alliance with nations which
might resolve to cooperate, such as West Ger
many, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, or to with
draw to the western hemisphere and such
Atlantic islands as we are invited to use as
bases.
The administration's predicament again
shows the hollowness of depending upon the
vague assurances of treaties. The North At
lantic pact exacted no specific promises. To
have been effective, it would have been neces
sary for the treaty to embody hard and fast
pledges as to what military contributions each
partner was to make and what organizational
structure would take form.
The treaty did not do this. In effect, it was
a unilateral pledge by the United States to
defend a dozen countries in the event of at
tack without requiring any reciprocal guar
antees from them. The United States is now
handcuffed. It has based its policy for Eu
rope on a document which, as like as not, will
never be translated into anything effective.
The experience shows the foolhardiness of
signing one-way undertakings in which no
slightest concern is taken in the elementary
interests of this cduntry.
