eace Moves;
e by Britain
m
ussia Changes Tactics
DITION
TWO
SECTIONS
FIVE CENTS A COPY
Three new moves by the Soviets and their satellites
have set the stage for what appears to be a major Commu
nist peace drive.
1. Russia, through the chief of the Soviet Control Com
mission in Germany, Gen. Vassily I. Chuikov, has sug
gested a four-power conference on a German peace treaty,
2. Communist China has carried its appeal for an armi
stice in Korea to the United Nations in a formal note.
3. North Korea has disclosed that it, too, supports
Peking's proposal for an armistice in Korea.
Still another major diplomatic move took shape when
Yugoslavia's President Tito, in a speech in Belgrade, dis
closed that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had,
promised to go to the military aid of Yugoslavia if the*
latter ever were attacked by another party.
The Soviet peace move, meanwhile, was felt immediately
in United States stock markets and Washington economic
headquarters: Page 12.
By Joseph C. Harsch
Special Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The change in Soviet strategy and tactics since the end of
the Stalin reign now has reached major proportions and is
commanding the first attention of the leaders of the Allied
governments.
The latest movean appeal by the Soviet High Commis
sioner in Germany, Gen-. Vassily I. Chuikov, for a resumption
of four-power talks on Germanycatches Washington almost
breathless.
General Chuikov, in a letter published in the Diisseldorf
Communist newspaper Freies Volk, March 31, suggested that
four-power talks for a peace treaty with Germany be resumed.
Such a letter could not have been written without knowledge
of thè Kremlin high command. Addressing himself to the
German Rally, a group headed by pre-Hitler Chancellor Joseph
Wirth, who favors close cooperation with Russia, General
j Chuikov declared that his country always had sought "a just
peace treaty with Germany."
General Chuikov was to meet with British representatives
March 31 in an attempt to agree on air traffic regulations that
would protect western planes from further attacks by .Soviet
I fliers. On that occasion he might possibly elaborate on his
suggestion.
This move came as the White House and State Department
were trying to decide the right response to the proposal of
Communist China's Premier, Chou En-lai, for a resumption
of the Korean truce talks.
The time has long since passed when western leaders re
garded the post-Stalin maneuverings of the Kremlin as being
dismissable as mere propaganda. That was the inclination
when the new head of the Soviet state, Prime Minister Georgi
M. Malenkov, asserted in his Stalin funeral oration the propo
sition that all issues outstanding between East and West were
negotiable. The "mere propaganda" interpretation ceased to
be tenable, however, when the Russians began implementing
mere words with specific actions.
Definite Sequence Noted
The sequence now stands as follows:
Following the Malenkov oration at Stalin's funeral, the
Russian propaganda apparatus for about 10 days ceased to
employ the usual abusive language to the western Allies.
The share of the western Allies in the victory over Germany
was admitted in Moscow propaganda.
Regret was expressed over the loss of British lives in the
shooting of a British plane, and this was followed by proposals
for talks with the British to avoid a repetition Those talks are
in process now.
Britain and France were advised that¥Moscow would under
take to secure the release from North Korea of their, diplomats
interned since the beginning of the Korean war.
Immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in Korea
was proposed. 'fe, MÈt"
Mr. Chou proposed resumption of the Kite an trüqé talks
on the basis of voluntary exchange >of prisoners.
And now General Chuikov has sent up a trial balloon on
resumption of German peace treaty talks. A
No Concrete ResultsYet H
None of these moves has produced concrete results yet. The
Korean war goes on. Communists in the Italian Parliament
have rioted with extraordinary violence against the new
Italian election laws which should reduce their numbers in
the Italian Parliament.
The sound of Russian bullets shooting American and British
planes still echoes through the corridors of western foreign
offices.
However, it is plain that the new Soviet Government has
embarked on a major departure in applied policy toward the
cold war.
The meaning of it is open to a wide range of interpretation.
At one end of the scale is the possibility that all of this is an
extremely sophisticated operation designed to relax the alert-
ness of the West.
Western leaders who have remarked many times: "What
would we do without the Russians?" note that the Russians
now are doing precisely the thing's which would be best calcu
lated to lull western public opinion and western legislatures
into a new mood of complacency in which rearmament would
be maintained only with the greatest difficulty.
Decisive Test Still Awaited
At the opposite end of the scale is the possibility that the
new Kremlin is having' such trouble consolidating, its position
at home that it seeks a real end to the cold war to permit it to
consolidate in comparative safety.
The decisive test can come only if and when some one "of
these various moves leads to actual talks and the talks them
selves lead either to a new crisis or to some substantial result.
In the meantime,, however, it can be noted that there is one
consistent element in all the moves. They relate to matters
at issue between East and West at or beyond the frontiers
of the Soviet empire.
This leads to the most plausible interim interpretation of
the Kremlin's purposes.
This is that the new Soviet regime does not at this stage
of its development possess the energy, the prestige, and' the
influence to attempt to maintain the triple operation of Stalin
policy which involved (1) maximum expansion of Russian
power beyond the Iron Curtain, (2) expansion of Russia's con
trol over its satellites, and (3) support of the first two policies
by austerity at home involving heavy privations on the Rus
sian people.
j Multiple Burden on Russia
If one assumes that this operation has imposed an impossible
burden on the new regime, it follows that the Soviet leaders
must have concluded that for the time being at least it would
be necessary to liquidate the external enterprises to reduce the
strain to manageable proportions at home.
The Korean war probably was imposing a strain on both the
home front and on relations with Communist China, which are
undoubtedly regarded in Moscow as the most vital; and deli-
i cate, strands in the Soviet power system.
It is reasonable to presume that Stalin had the power and
influence to support the strain at home and to hold Peking to
his purposes. But Mr. Malenkov probably does not dare main
tain as much austerity at home as Stalin did, or to put as much
weight on the leading strings to Peking.
